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THANKS, OBAMA! “FAIR PAY AND SAFE WORKPLACES” COME AT THE COST OF 
MANDATORY  PRE-DISPUTE  EMPLOYMENT  ARBITRATION 
By 
Andrew C. Fillmore* 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
On July 31, 2014, President Barack Obama signed into law Executive Order 
13673, titled “Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces,” which imposed changes to labor laws in 
the United States.1 In an attempt to “increase efficiency and cost savings” in the work 
performed by government contractors, the President transformed the way these federal 
contractors are regulated.2 Specifically, the Executive Order prohibits companies with 
federal contracts greater than $1 million from including mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in employee contracts for claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 19643 (“Title VII”) or any tort related to sexual assault or harassment.4 With few 
exceptions to the requirement, the President believes this will help improve contractors’ 
compliance with labor laws.5 
The Executive Order expands a similar policy enacted by Congress in 2009, 
commonly known as the Franken Amendment, which restricts arbitration in certain 
circumstances for Department of Defense contractors.6 Excluding the Franken 
Amendment, Congress has been consistently unwilling to pass legislation that would 
further limit mandatory arbitration for all general consumers and employees.7 
The issuance of the Executive Order is controversial for numerous reasons. First, 
although  the  President  maintains  authority  to  issue  executive  orders  governing  the 
 
 
 
 
 
* Andrew C. Fillmore is an Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation, a 2016 Juris 
Doctor candidate at the Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law, and a 2016 Master of 
Business Administration candidate at the Pennsylvania State University Smeal College of Business. 
 
1 Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014) [hereinafter Executive Order]. 
 
2 Id. 
 
3 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (“Equal Employment 
Opportunity.”). 
 
4 See Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (July 31, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- 
office/2014/07/31/fact-sheet-fair-pay-and-safe-workplaces-executive-order  [hereinafter  Fact  Sheet]. 
 
5 See id. 
 
6 Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116, 123 Stat. 3409, 3454 
(2009). 
 
7 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. 3026, 107th Cong. (2002); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 
310, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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Executive Branch,8 executive orders may by subject to judicial review or overriding 
legislative action.9 Second, the Executive Order appears to be the President’s way of 
circumventing a gridlocked Congress to create new law.10 Additionally, the restriction on 
arbitration contradicts years of established Supreme Court precedent and several well- 
respected interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act11 (“FAA”).12 This Executive 
Order also presents the issue of permanence; a new presidential administration can easily 
repeal President Obama’s limits on arbitration.13 Ultimately, the Executive Order will 
likely result in an increase in the financial costs of contracting with the federal 
government, a cost that will eventually be passed through to the U.S. taxpayers.14 
Although not readily apparent, the issuance of this Executive Order creates the potential 
for great costs and balance of powers complications in the near future. 
This article will discuss the significance of the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces 
Executive Order and its impact on arbitration in the United States. Part II will examine 
the details and language of the Executive Order, in its entirety. Part III will investigate 
the historical basis of the arbitral language of the Executive Order and compare how the 
language has evolved. Part IV will consider the conflicts of arbitrability that arise among 
the Executive Order and several U.S. Supreme Court opinions. Finally, Part V concludes 
with an analysis of the consequences impacting multiple branches of the Government, 
federal contractors, and employees as a result of the Executive Order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014) (“By the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including 40 U.S.C. 121, and in order to 
promote economy and efficiency in procurement by contracting with responsible sources who comply with 
labor laws, it is hereby ordered . . . .”). 
 
9 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also John C. Duncan Jr., A 
Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. 
REV. 333, 362, 369-70 (2010). 
 
10 See Philip Bump, The 113th Congress is Historically Good at Not Passing Bills, WASHINGTON POST 
(July 9, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/07/09/the-113th- 
congress-is-historically-good-at-not-passing-bills/. 
 
11 The United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2013). 
 
12 See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 
556 U.S. 247 (2009); Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Alexander v. Gardner - 
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 
13 See generally Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders and Other Presidential 
Directives, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 267, 305 (2001). 
 
14 See Geoff Burr, Nothing’s Fair About Obama’s Fair Pay Order, GOVEXEC.COM (Sept. 12, 2014), 
available at http://www.govexec.com/contracting/2014/09/nothings-fair-about-obamas-fair-pay- 
order/93866/. 
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II.  DETAILS OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER 
 
The goal of the Executive Order is to “increase efficiency and cost savings in the 
work performed by parties who contract with the Federal Government by ensuring that 
they understand and comply with labor laws.”15 The Administration provides support for 
the Executive Order’s change to labor law compliance by referencing a 2010 report 
issued by the Government Accountability Office, which found that many companies cited 
for labor law violations received government contracts.16 The Executive Order was 
designed to help ensure that “all hardworking Americans get the fair pay and safe 
workplaces they deserve.”17 
In addition to the impact on arbitration, the Executive Order includes two major 
provisions for government contractors: (1) mandatory disclosure of prior labor law 
violations,18 and (2) greater paycheck transparency for employers.19 
 
A.  Disclosures of Labor Law Violations 
 
The Executive Order provides that all companies seeking to bid on government 
contracts for goods and services in excess of $500,000 must represent any administrative 
merits determination, arbitral award or decision, or civil judgment rendered against the 
bidder within the preceding three-year period for any violation of labor laws.20 
Additionally, the Executive Order requires the newly created “Labor Compliance 
Advisors” to review these disclosures and determine whether an offeror is a responsible 
source that has a “satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics.”21  The Labor 
Compliance Advisors will consult with the Department of Labor in establishing the 
appropriate standards.22 Additionally, these disclosure requirements cover any 
subcontractors  that  the  potential  contractor  would  utilize  for  the  fulfillment  of  the 
 
 
 
15 Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014). 
 
16 See Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (July 31, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- 
office/2014/07/31/fact-sheet-fair-pay-and-safe-workplaces-executive-order (reporting that almost two- 
thirds of the fifty largest wage and hour violations and nearly forty percent of the fifty largest workplace 
health and safety penalties from FY2005 to FY 2009 were at companies that went on to receive new 
government  contracts). 
 
17 See Fact Sheet, supra note 4. 
 
18 See Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014). 
 
19 See id. 
 
20 See id. 
 
21 See id. 
 
22 See id. 
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contract.23 After the contract has been awarded, the Executive Order requires that each 
federal contractor and subcontractor, subject to the pre-award notifications, provide 
updates on any labor law violations every six months for the duration of the contract.24 
 
B.  Paycheck Transparency 
 
The Executive Order creates an additional requirement for federal contractors 
with contracts in excess of $500,000 to be more transparent with an employee’s 
paycheck.25 Each pay period, contractors must provide all individuals performing work 
under the contract with a document that clearly details that individual’s hours worked, 
overtime hours, pay, and any additions or deductions made to the individual’s pay.26 This 
requirement is also incorporated for any subcontractors working on the project.27 
Additionally, if the contractor is treating an individual performing work under a contract 
or subcontract as an independent contractor, and not as an employee, the contractor must 
provide a document clearly informing the individual of this status.28 
 
C.  Complaint and Dispute Transparency 
 
The Executive Order limits mandatory pre-dispute arbitration by stating: 
 
(a)   Agencies shall ensure that for all contracts where the estimated value 
of the supplies acquired and services required exceeds $1 million, 
provisions in solicitations and clauses in contracts shall provide that 
contractors agree that the decision to arbitrate claims arising under title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any tort related to or arising out of 
sexual assault or harassment may only be made with the voluntary consent 
of   employees   or   independent   contractors   after   such   disputes 
arise. Agencies shall also require that contractors incorporate this same 
requirement into subcontracts where the estimated value of the supplies 
acquired       and       services       required       exceeds       $1       million. 
 
(b)  Subsection  (a)  of  this  section  shall  not  apply  to  contracts  or 
 
 
 
 
23 See Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014). 
 
24 See id. 
 
25 See id. 
 
26 See id. 
 
27 See id. 
 
28 See Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014). 
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subcontracts for the acquisition of commercial items or commercially 
available off-the-shelf items. 
 
(c)  A contractor's or subcontractor's agreement under subsection (a) of this 
section to arbitrate certain claims only with the voluntary post-dispute 
consent of employees or independent contractors shall not apply with 
respect to: 
 
(i)  employees who are covered by any type of collective bargaining 
agreement negotiated between the contractor and a labor 
organization representing them; or 
 
(ii)  employees or independent contractors who entered into a valid 
contract to arbitrate prior to the contractor or subcontractor bidding 
on a contract covered by this order, except that a contractor's or 
subcontractor's agreement under subsection (a) of this section to 
arbitrate certain claims only with the voluntary post-dispute 
consent of employees or independent contractors shall apply if the 
contractor or subcontractor is permitted to change the terms of the 
contract with the employee or independent contractor, or when the 
contract is renegotiated or replaced.29 
 
As a result of the Executive Order, with the exception of limited situations,30 all 
federal contractors with a contract dated after July 31, 2014, in excess of $1 million, will 
need to carefully modify their employment contracts to provide for exceptions to 
arbitrability to provide employees their day in court and avoid violation.31 
 
III. THE FRANKEN AMENDMENT – THE BASIS FOR THE EXECUTIVE ORDER 
 
The arbitration provision in the Executive Order is an expansion of an amendment 
to the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill,32 which was enacted by 
Congress in 2009 and applicable only to Department of Defense contractors.33  The 
 
 
29 See Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014). 
 
30 See id. (finding certain exceptions are made for commercial items or commercially available off-the-shelf 
items, employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement, or employees or independent contractors 
who entered into a valid contract to arbitrate prior to bidding on a federal contract). 
 
31 See Fact Sheet, supra note 4. 
 
32 H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. § 8116 (2009). 
 
33 See Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (July 31, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- 
office/2014/07/31/fact-sheet-fair-pay-and-safe-workplaces-executive-order (noting that the Department of 
Defense is the largest federal contracting agency). 
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legislation was introduced by Minnesota Senator, Al Franken, and subsequently became 
known as the Franken Amendment.34 The Franken Amendment was prompted by Jones 
v. Halliburton Co.35 (“Jones”), a case involving the rape of Jamie Leigh Jones, a female 
government contractor, by her co-workers.36 Jones brought an action against her former 
employer, Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), for tort claims based on her alleged sexual 
assault.37 KBR responded with an attempt to compel arbitration per the terms of the 
employment contract.38 The Fifth Circuit concluded that a valid agreement to arbitrate 
existed, but ultimately determined that four of Jones’ claims should not be submitted to 
arbitration, because these claims were not related to the employment contract.39 
Compelled by Jones, Congress sought to introduce legislation that would prevent 
similar situations from occurring in the future.40 Senator Franken explained his belief that 
arbitration was an efficient forum for commercial disputes, however, unfit for “claims of 
sexual assault and egregious violations of civil rights.”41 Senator Franken authored an 
amendment which prohibited Department of Defense contractors with contracts in excess 
of $1 million from requiring employees to arbitrate claims arising under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 or tort claims related to or arising out of sexual assault or 
harassment.42 In order for the amendment to garner enough support to pass, members of 
the House and Senate required certain modifications to narrow the application of the 
amendment.43 One modification included the addition of a waiver clause, which granted 
the Secretary of Defense the authority to bypass the arbitration requirements where 
“necessary to avoid harm to the national security interests of the United States.”44  The 
 
 
 
34 Jeffrey Adams, The Assault of Jamie Leigh Jones: How One Woman’s Horror Story Is Changing 
Arbitration in America, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 253, 258-61 (2011) (discussing the legislative 
introduction of the Franken Amendment). 
 
35 Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 
36 See generally Jones, 583 F.3d at 228. 
 
37 See id. 
 
38 See id. 
 
39 See generally Jones, 583 F.3d at 242 (affirming the district court that the plaintiff’s claims for (1) assault 
and battery; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of the alleged assault; (3) negligent 
hiring, retention, and supervision of employees involved in the alleged assault; and (4) false imprisonment, 
do not touch matters related to employment required to go to arbitration). 
 
40 155 Cong. Rec. S10028 (Oct. 1, 2009). 
 
41 155 Cong. Rec. S10028 (Oct. 1, 2009) (explaining that due to the privacy of arbitration, serious 
violations are hidden from the public and also fails to establish precedent for future cases). 
 
42 See Adams, supra note 34. 
 
43 See Adams, supra note 34. 
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second modification required was to limit the amendment to apply only to federal 
contracts with a value greater than $1 million.45 
Following the passage of the Franken Amendment, Senator Franken sponsored 
the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011.46 This legislation stated that no pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement would be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an 
employment, consumer, or civil rights dispute.47 This proposed expansion on the limits to 
arbitration was referred to a congressional committee, but eventually  failed.48 
Periodically since 2002, similar legislation has been introduced in Congress, but has 
consistently failed to gather the requisite support to become binding law.49 
 
IV. THE   EXECUTIVE   ORDER   CONTRADICTS   THE   FEDERAL   POLICY   FAVORING 
ARBITRATION 
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act50 (“FAA”) which 
legitimizes arbitration agreements and establishes a presumption in favor of their 
enforceability.51 Included in §1 of the FAA was an employment contract exclusion.52 
Under this exclusion, the FAA would not apply to the resolution of disputes that arise 
 
 
 
44 See Jeffrey Adams, The Assault of Jamie Leigh Jones: How One Woman’s Horror Story Is Changing 
Arbitration in America, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 253, 258-61 (2011) ( “(a) The Secretary of Defense may 
waive, in accordance with paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section, the applicability of paragraphs (a) or (b) 
of 222.7402, to a particular contract or subcontract, if the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary personally determines 
that the waiver is necessary to avoid harm to national security interests of the United States, and that the term of 
the contract or subcontract is not longer than necessary to avoid such harm.”). 
 
45 See generally Adams, supra note 34; see also H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. § 8116 (2009). 
 
46 H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 
47 Id. 
 
48 Id. 
 
49 See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. 3026, 107th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2002); see also, Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); see also, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 
H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); see also, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); see also, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2013). 
 
50 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2013). 
 
51 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (concluding that 
“questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring 
arbitration.”). 
 
52 The United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883, codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2013) (“. . . but nothing herein 
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”). 
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from employment contracts of workers engaged in interstate commerce.53 Over the years, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has gradually interpreted the meaning of the text and explained 
that there should be a narrow reading of the FAA’s employment contract exclusion.54 
The abovementioned narrowing of the FAA’s employment contract exclusion is 
one example of how the U.S. Supreme Court has generally expanded the scope of 
arbitrability. The following five U.S. Supreme Court cases illustrate how the Court has 
created general federal policy favoring arbitration.55 
Initially, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,56 the Court examined under which 
circumstances, if any, an employee’s statutory right to trial under Title VII may be 
foreclosed by prior submission of his claim to final arbitration under the 
nondiscrimination clause of a CBA.57 The Court held that an employee’s statutory right 
to judicial de novo review under Title VII was not foreclosed by prior submission of the 
claim to arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a CBA.58 This early 
employment arbitration decision resurrected the old judicial mistrust of arbitrators to 
oversee important claims, such as Title VII.59 
In an attempt to resolve a circuit split, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,60 the 
Court reviewed the application of the employment exemption in the FAA for 
employment contracts.61 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the employment contract 
exemption shall be interpreted to apply only to the employment contracts of workers 
directly involved in the interstate transport of goods and services.62 As a result, 
employers are permitted to include arbitration requirements within the employment 
contracts of all other employees.63 
 
 
 
53 The United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883, codified at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2013) 
 
54 See Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118 (2001) (expanding on the scope of interstate 
commerce). 
 
55 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 at 24. 
 
56 See Alexander v. Gardner - Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 
57 See id. 
 
58 See id. at 59-60. 
 
59 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 267 (2009) (referring to the decision in Gardner - Denver 
as “pervaded by  . . . ‘the old judicial hostility to  arbitration.’” as cited in Rodriguez de Ouijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989)). 
 
60 See Circuit City Stores Inc., 532 U.S. at 105. 
 
61 See id. at 109. 
 
62 See Circuit City Stores Inc., 532 U.S. at 105. 
 
63 See id. 
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In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,64 the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with 
answering the question of whether a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that 
required union members to arbitrate claims arising under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”)65 was enforceable.66 In another 5-4 decision, the 
Court held that in a CBA which “clearly and unmistakably”67 waived an individuals 
rights to court and required the arbitration of ADEA claims was enforceable.68 Although 
not clearly stated, this decision repudiated the precedence of Gardner-Denver and found 
the recourse to arbitration of Civil Rights claims to be acceptable and enforceable.69 
Finally, in 2011, the Court released a monumental opinion with AT&T Mobility, 
LLC v. Concepcion.70 The case involved the controversial issue of class action waivers in 
consumer arbitration contracts.71 In Concepcion, the Court examined whether the savings 
clause72 in § 2 of the FAA preempted state law with regard to class action waivers.73 The 
Court broadly held that the main goal of the FAA was to ensure the enforcement of 
private arbitration agreements according to their terms; therefore, conflicting state law 
was preempted.74 Furthermore, the Court also acknowledged the issue of adhesive 
arbitration agreements and found the agreements to be presumptively valid, regardless of 
the appearance of a disproportionate bargaining power between the contracting parties.75 
 
 
 
 
64 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 247. 
 
65 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§6101-07 (2014). 
 
66 See generally 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 247. 
 
67 See id. at 274. 
 
68 See generally 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 247. 
 
69 See 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 249 (“That skepticism, however, rested on a misconceived view of 
arbitration that this Court has since abandoned” in reference to Gardner-Denver). 
 
70 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740. 
 
71 See id. at 1744. 
 
72 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (providing that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”). 
 
73 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (finding the Discover Bank rule, which disfavors class waivers in 
consumer contracts, conflicts with the provisions of FAA §2 intended to place arbitration agreements “on 
equal footing with other contracts.”). 
 
74 See generally Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740. 
 
75 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 
(1991) (“Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration 
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.”). 
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You really should summarize here about the policy or note the evolution towards 
favoring arbitration. Then add in specifically how the EO impacts this. Otherwise this 
section seems kind of out of place and unnecessary. Just tie it in to what your point is 
with the dichotomy between Supreme Court jurisprudence and the EO. It can just be a 
paragraph. 
 
V.  CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER FOR ALL PARTIES IMPACTED 
 
Although  the  Executive  Order  only  contains  brief  language  on  arbitration,  the 
consequences of this Order are wide-spread for the many parties involved. 
 
A.  Federal Government 
 
The Fair Play and Safe Workplaces Executive Order demonstrates the conflicting 
views on the role of arbitration among the separate branches of government. The 
President, exercising his executive power, issued the Executive Order prohibiting 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration for federal contracts.76 The President justifies these 
actions by claiming that the exclusion will “help improve contractors’ compliance with 
labor laws.”77 Unlike the congressionally approved Franken Amendment, here, the 
President has unilaterally enacted law to impose a push for greater oversight of labor 
practices throughout the Federal Government.78 The President’s orders will be considered 
valid only when the issue stems from a statutory delegation or from the U.S. 
Constitution.79 Here, the President anchors his executive authority to issue his Executive 
Order in not only the U.S. Constitution, but also 40 U.S.C. 121, related to his managerial 
functions over federal property and administrative services.80 As noted by the Supreme 
Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,81 however, when acting without 
congressional reinforcement, the President is acting with a lesser variety of power.82 
 
 
 
 
76 See generally Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014). 
 
77 See Fact Sheet, supra note 4. 
 
78 See Fact Sheet, supra note 4. 
 
79 Tara L. Branum, President Or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 
28   J.   LEGIS.   1,   63-64   (2002)   (citing   to   Dames   &   Moore   v.   Regan,   453   U.S.   654,   668 
(1981) quoting Youngstown). 
 
80 Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014). 
 
81 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579. 
 
82 John C. Duncan Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the 
Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 385 (2010) (citing to Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in 
Youngstown where the President can act with congress, when congress is silent, or contrary to congress). 
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While Congress has failed to pass legislation prohibiting arbitration in similar 
situations, 83 it has remained silent on the issue underlying the Executive Order. Congress 
has the authority to endorse or revoke all or part of an order, either by directly repealing 
the order or by removing the underlying authority on which the order is predicated.84 A 
1999 Cato Institute study examining the congressional review of executive orders found 
that Congress had modified or revoked 239 executive orders.85 Due to the extensive 
process involved and the current congressional stalemate, Congress is likely to remain 
silent on the issue of whether the President is overstepping his authority with the 
Executive Order.86 This silent congressional inaction may be mistakenly seen by the U.S. 
Supreme Court as congressional affirmation.87 
The U.S. Supreme Court holds an opposing view from the President’s Executive 
Order and appears content on expanding the “federal policy favoring arbitration.”88 Over 
the years, the Supreme Court has allowed a majority of issues to proceed to arbitration, 
including mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment contracts and 
Title VII claims.89 Much like the President’s Executive Order, the progressive 
interpretation of the FAA by the Supreme Court has been performed and unchallenged in 
light of the congressional silence. Although there is judicial deference, the Supreme 
Court also has the authority to review and overturn the President’s Executive Order by 
declaring the order to be unconstitutional.90 
 
 
 
 
 
83 See generally Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. 3026, 107th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2002); Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 
1020, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 
84 See Duncan Jr., supra note 82. 
 
85 See generally Branum, supra note 79; see also John Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Executive Orders: 
Washington – Obama, The American Presidency Project, available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/orders.php (last modified Oct. 20, 2014) (finding there have been 
15,245 Executive Orders issued between 1798 and October, 20, 2014); see also Vivian S. Chu & Todd 
Garvey, Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation, (April 16, 2014), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20846.pdf (“One study has suggested that less than 4% of executive orders 
have been modified by Congress.”); see also Duncan Jr., supra note 82. 
 
86 Bump, supra note 10. 
 
87 See Duncan Jr., supra note 82. 
 
88 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (“Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies 
to the contrary.”). 
 
89 See generally Circuit City Stores Inc., 532 U.S. at 105; 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 249. 
 
90 See John C. Duncan Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the 
Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 376, 392 (2010) (citing Youngstown). 
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This was the situation in Chamber of Commerce v. Reich91 which related to a 
challenge on President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,954 preventing federal contractors 
from hiring permanent replacements for striking workers.92 The President used his 
authority93 to create an order designed “to ensure economical and efficient administration 
and completion of Federal Government contracts.”94 Similar to the current Executive 
Order, Reich raised the larger issue of whether a president may regulate private 
employment conduct without intruding on the lawmaking powers of Congress.95 Upon 
judicial review, President Clinton attempted to justify his actions under the Federal 
Property and Administrative Services Act96 (“Procurement Act”).97 The Court noted, 
however, that the Procurement Act does not provide the President with unlimited 
authority to make decisions he believes will likely result in savings to the government.98 
The Supreme Court ultimately revoked the executive order, finding that the President’s 
actions explicitly violated the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)99 and hence the 
will of Congress.100 
After review of Reich, it appears possible that an employer organization 
representing federal contractors could raise a judicial challenge to President Obama’s 
 
 
 
91 Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 
92 See Duncan Jr., supra note 82. 
 
93 Exec. Order No. 12954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13023 (Mar. 8, 1995) (“[B]y the authority vested in me as President 
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including 40 U.S.C. 486(a) and 3 U.S.C. 
301 . . . .”). 
 
94 See John C. Duncan Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the 
Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 389 n.440 (2010) (quoting Exec. Order No. 12954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13023 
(Mar. 8, 1995)). 
 
95 See Michael H. LeRoy, Presidential Regulation of Private Employment: Constitutionality of Executive 
Order 12,954 Debarment of Contractors Who Hire Permanent Striker Replacements, 37 B.C. L. REV. 229, 
231 (1996) (“By effectively implementing the terms of this bill, Executive Order 12,954 appears to be an 
end-run around Congress.”); see also John C. Duncan Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: 
Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 392 (2010) (“The President’s 
executive order appeared to be attempting to supplant the ordinary legislative process by stretching the 
meaning of the tangential legislation so as to overturn a significant judicial precedent.”). 
 
96 Reich, 74 F.3d at 1324 (citing 40 USC § 471). 
 
97 See Duncan Jr., supra note 82, at 390. 
 
98 See Reich, 74 F.3d at 1330 (referring to the decision in AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 793 (1979)). 
 
99 National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). 
 
100 See John C. Duncan Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in 
the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 390 (2010) (explaining how the Court also found that the executive 
order contradicted the explicit holding of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938)). 
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authority to issue the Executive Order impacting labor laws.101 In reality, however, the 
chances that the courts would overturn the Executive Order are remote.102 
Additionally, the President’s directives that have not been ratified by Congress are 
only as permanent as the succeeding President.103 A new administration has the authority 
to explicitly amend, replace, or revoke executive orders as simply as signing a new 
executive order.104 As a result, certain executive orders have become a political “tug-of- 
war” with each subsequent administration.105  Depending on the political affiliation and 
associated policies, the new administration in 2016 will easily be able to modify the 
Executive Order if desired. 
Moreover, the Executive  Order creates financial costs  to be  incurred by  the 
federal government for ensuring compliance and prosecuting violators of the new labor 
laws on an on-going basis. The newly created Labor Compliance Advisors will be 
responsible for enforcing these tasks under the Department of Labor.106 Unlike the one- 
time compliance requirements prohibiting arbitration in employment contracts for federal 
contractors, several parts of the Executive Order requires that the government receive 
updates from all contractors and sub-contractors every six months.107 
 
 
 
 
 
101 See John C. Duncan Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in 
the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 389 (2010) (referring to Reich, where an employer organization 
challenged President Clinton’s executive order through Robert Reich, former Secretary of Labor 
responsible for enforcement of the order). 
 
102 Tara L. Branum, President Or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 
28 J. LEGIS. 1, 59 (2002) (explaining how Courts have seen eighty-six challenges to Executive Orders, but 
only two have been wholly overturned, including Youngstown); see also See John C. Duncan Jr., A Critical 
Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 
389-92 (2010) (citing to the second overturned President Clinton’s Executive Order 12954); but see AFL- 
CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 793 (1979) (upholding President Carter’s Executive Order 12092 denying 
government contracts to bidders who did not  meet  certain wage and price controls as there was a 
sufficiently close nexus between the order and the “economy” and “efficiency” criteria in the Federal 
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 statute where the President based his authority). 
 
103 See Gaziano, supra note 13. 
 
104 See Gaziano, supra note 13; see also Michael H. LeRoy, Presidential Regulation of Private 
Employment: Constitutionality of Executive Order 12,954 Debarment of Contractors Who Hire Permanent 
Striker Replacements, 37 B.C. L. REV. 229, 284 (1996). 
 
105 See generally Amy Sullivan, Shhh. Obama Repeals the Abortion Gag Rule, Very Quietly, TIME.COM 
(Jan. 23, 2009), available at http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1873794,00.html 
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106 See Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014). 
 
107 See id. 
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B. Federal Government Contractors 
 
As a result of the Executive order, doing business with the US Government has 
become significantly less attractive for government contractors by prohibiting mandatory 
arbitration. The administration estimates that the Executive Order will impact 24,000 
large and small businesses.108 These businesses vie for federal contracts in a marketplace 
worth approximately $500 billion per year.109 As a result of the prohibition on mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses for employees and independent contractors, businesses 
will lose significant autonomy, thus creating significant hardships. Recent studies have 
found that an estimated 25% of all American employers use mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in their employment contracts.110 These employers must now modify 
their employment contracts not only for employees directly working under a federally- 
funded contract, but also those employees in non-governmental roles.111 Additionally, as 
stated throughout all portions of the Executive Order, direct contractors now have the 
added responsibility of enforcing and monitoring the employment contracts in place for 
any subcontractors utilized to ensure their own compliance.112 This is not only an added 
expense, but a heavy burden placed on both large and small businesses. 
The Executive Order will impact the financial costs of doing business with the 
federal government. Arbitration functions as an alternative to judicial litigation through 
less expensive, expedited, and fair proceedings.113 Contractors will now look to 
recuperate the potential cost of less efficient and often unpredictable judicial litigation of 
claims.114 The financial impact of the Executive Order will be felt by employers by 
increasing the cost, as traditional judicial means tend to be more expensive, and by 
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112 See generally Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014). 
 
113 See Circuit City Stores Inc., 532 U.S. at 123. 
 
114 See Burr, supra note 14; see also Dierich Knauth, Contractors Say Executive Order Contradicts Labor 
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providing potentially increased damage awards to plaintiffs by sympathetic jurors.115 
These increased costs for judicial litigation of employment disputes will discourage 
contract participation, specifically for smaller businesses, leading to larger awarded bids 
which will ultimately be borne by the U.S. taxpayers.116 
Although the Executive Order’s full consequential impact on contractors will 
remain unknown in the near future, contractors will likely attempt to circumvent the 
associated restriction on mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in a number of ways. 
Contractors could do so by adding certain modifications to their employment contracts. 
Contractors may include pre-dispute jury waivers in their contracts to prevent runaway 
and  unpredictable  jury  trials  where  excessive  awards  can  cripple  a  business.117 
Alternatively, contractors may attempt to include limits on punitive damages in their 
employment contracts for judicial awards. This is similar to contracting parties in an 
arbitration agreement limiting the amount of punitive damages awarded by an 
arbitrator.118 Contractors may also attempt to limit the impact of the Executive Order to 
selective employees by creating wholly owned subsidiaries, exclusively for federal 
contracts. This major transformation would prevent the prohibition on mandatory pre- 
dispute arbitration from applying to employees within the entire organization. Although 
these methods of eluding the Executive Order may create their own burdens, contractors 
that are negatively impacted by the President’s actions may be willing to push the 
boundaries in order to spark a reaction from Congress or challenge the Executive Order 
in the judicial system. 
 
C. Employees 
 
The intended beneficiaries of the Executive Order are the employees of government 
contractors who will now be given “a day in court,” while still allowing for employees to 
pursue voluntary post-dispute consensual arbitration.119 During the passage of the 
Franken Amendment, one Senator in support of the bill estimated that “at least 30 million 
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workers have unknowingly signed employment contracts and waived their constitutional 
rights to have their civil rights resolved by a jury.”120 Proponents of greater employee 
rights have argued that arbitration is unsuitable for employment issues, specifically for 
claims of civil rights’ violations or sexual harassment.121 One argument consistently 
raised is the lack of transparency in arbitration due to the absence of a jury of one’s peers 
and no judicial precedence for the arbitrator to respect.122 Furthermore, judicial 
adjudication more frequently allows for an employee to be awarded punitive damages 
and injunctive relief as a deterrent to undesirable employer behaviors.123 Moreover, 
proponents argue that the arbitrator is less accountable than a traditional judge.124 
Employee rights advocates have argued that when the employment contract calls for the 
employer to pay the arbitrators, this creates the appearance of impropriety with the 
potential for “repeat players” bias.125 Moreover, employees impacted by the Executive 
Order will now be able to bring a claim in a local forum, reducing their travel costs and 
other associated expenses.126 An additional argument presented is that the privacy offered 
through arbitration is inappropriate for Civil Rights claims and claims of sexual assault or 
harassment, as this privacy protection diminishes the publics’ retribution for 
employers.127 
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One exception permitted under the Executive Order is for employees who are 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the contractor and 
representative of the labor organization.128 This exception exemplifies the distinction 
between labor arbitration and employment arbitration. The reasoning for this exception in 
the Order can be justified by the comparable bargaining power of the union 
representative and the employer to negotiate the employment contract.129 A similar notion 
exists in the Ninth Circuit, where the Court remains hostile to arbitration.130 Additionally, 
the Executive Order may be a way for President Obama to incentivize the Federal 
Government to contract or subcontract with unionized employers.131 While many 
employee rights groups will likely support the CBA exemption in the Order, the impact 
of the exemption will presumably be minimal; only 11.3% of the U.S. workforce belongs 
to a union.132 Overall, similar to the Franken Amendment, many employee rights 
advocates will likely consider that this Executive Order to be a step in the right direction 
and will eventually lead to further expansion in all employment contracts. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
With the issuance of the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order,   
President Obama has single-handily imposed significant changes to labor laws 
regulating government contractors in an attempt to increase efficiency and cost savings 
in the work performed. Specifically, the President’s ban on mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements in employee contracts for federal contracts and conflicts with  
the federal policy favoring arbitration. This governmental restriction on arbitration  
runs contrary to decades of Supreme Court precedent allowing arbitration in many 
different contexts, including employment agreements and Title VII claims. 
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As a result of the Executive Order providing employees with the option of 
pursuing judicial resolution of disputes, there will be negative consequences for both 
the federal government and potential government contractors. The compliance costs of 
enforcing the Executive Order will financially impact the federal government, 
contractors, and ultimately, the U.S. taxpayers. Federal contractors are now forced to 
scrupulously craft their employment contracts to allow employees to pursue certain 
claims in the costly and often inefficient, judicial setting. Ultimately, the Executive 
Order promoting fair pay and safe workplaces in the Federal Government comes with 
costs that far outweighs the benefits. 
